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NOTES AND COMMENT
Editor-JAMES F. KELLY
INJUNCTIVE RELIEF FROM CONFISCATORY ORDERS OF REGULATORY
BODIES PENDING LITIGATION.
Rate-making litigation with its laborious tasks and well-paid
experts to do them, is an expensive undertaking. Each added item
of expense brings a proportionate reduction in the benefit to the public
resulting from rate regulation of public utilities. It is particularly
regrettable when, as in the recent Interborough Rapid Transit Com-
pany litigation in the federal courts, additional expenditures of hun-
dreds of thousands of dollars, are incurred to ascertain only that there
was an improvident exercise of judicial discretion in an ancillary
action.
A great deal has been said of the decision of the United States
Supreme Court 1 which reversed the order of the Statutory Court.2
The Statutory Court had granted an interlocutory injunction restrain-
ing the Public Service Commission of New York from interfering
with the rate of fare charged by the Transit Company. From a
viewpoint unbiased by political views or personal gain motives, the
following excerpt seems to present the gist of the Supreme Court
opinion:
"Considering the entire record we believe the challenged
order was improvident and beyond the proper discretion of the
Court." 3
It appears that the decision of the highest court of the land rests
simply on the application of fundamental principles of equity juris-
prudence. There was a failure on the part of the petitioner to make
out a case justifying summary relief, or to prove a condition so bur-
'Gilchrist et al. v. Interborough Rapid Transit Co. et al., 279 U. S. 156,
49 Sup. Ct. Rep. 282 (1929).
'26 Fed. (2d) 912 (S. D. N. Y., 1928) Section 266 of the Judicial Code(28 U. S. C. A., Sec. 380) provides: "No interlocutory injunction suspending
or restraining the enforcement, operation or execution of any statute of a
state by restraining the * * * enforcement of an order made by an adminis-
trative board or commission * * * shall be issued or granted * * * unless the
application for the same shall be presented to a justice of the Supreme Court
of the United States, or to a circuit or district judge, and shall be heard and
determined by three judges, of whom at least one shall be a justice of the
Supreme Court or a circuit judge, and the other two may be either circuit
or district judges, and unless a majority of said three judges shall concur
in granting such application."
'Supra Note 1 at 207. 49 Sup. Ct. Rep. at 288.
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densome as to render the granting of an injunction, a proper exercise
of judicial discretion.
"It is well settled that the granting of a temporary injunc-
tion pending a final hearing is within the sound discretion of
the trial court, and that upon appeal, an order granting such an
injunction will not be disturbed unless contrary to some rule
of equity, or the result of improvident exercise of judicial
discretion." 4
It is significant, however, that among the twelve members of the
judiciary who considered the Interborough application, there was
evenly divided opinion as to whether the facts in the record warranted
summary relief.5 Apparently the propriety of such relief admits of
considerable debate and it'may.therefore be useful to discuss the basis
upon which the Court will grant a temporary injunction restraining
state regulatory bodies.
Rate regulation with respect to utilities engaged in intrastate
business is a power which belongs to the state within which the utility
is operating. The determination of what is a proper rate is a legis-
lative act and not a judicial act r though the categorical classification
as such, is much discussed and criticized .7 Opportunity for judicial
review of the legislative pronouncement must be given.5 In pleading
confiscation the utility may invoke either the jurisdiction of the
federal courts or the state courts and when jurisdiction by the former
has been obtained it is exclusive. 9
In the leading case of Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line 10 the utility
applied to the Federal Court for an injunction to restrain the Coin-
'Prendergast v. New York Tel. Co., 262 U. S. 43, 51, 43 Sup. Ct. Rep.
466, 469 (1922) citing Meccano, Ltd. v. John Wanamaker, 253 U. S. 136,
40 Sup. Ct. Rep. 463 (1919).
'Three of the nine Justices of the Supreme Court dissented from the
opinion of the majority which reversed the order of the Statutory Court com-
posed of three Judges which had granted the injunction.
"lnfra Note 10, 211 U. S. at 226, 29 Sup. Ct. Rep. at 69, Lake Erie &
Western R. R. Co. v. Commission, 249 U. S. 422, 39 Sup. Ct. Rep. 345, 63
L. ed. 684 (1918).
" Ray A. Brown, The Functions of Courts and Commissions in Public
Utility Rate Regulation, 38 Harv. Law Rev. 141, 149 et seq., People v. Willcox,
194 N. Y. 383, 386, 87 N. E. 517 (1909).
8Ohio Valley Water Co. v. Ben Avon Borough, 253 U. S. 287, 40 Sup. Ct.
Rep. 527, 64 L. ed. 908 (1920); Oklahoma Operating Co. v. Love, 252 U. S.
331, 40 Sup. Ct. Rep. 338, 64 L. ed. 596 (1920) ; Missouri Pac. R. R. v. Tucker,
230 U. S. 340, 347, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 961, 57 L. ed. 1507 (1912). See Interstate
Commerce Commission v. Union Pac. R. Co., 222 U. S. 541, 32 Sup. Ct. Rep.
108, 56 L. ed. 308 (1911).
'Cohen v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 264, 404 (821); Hardrader v. Wadley, 172
U. S. 148, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 119 (1898); Mercantile Trust Co. v. Columbus,
203 U. S. 311, 27 Sup. Ct. Rep. 83 (1906) ; Columbus Railway, etc. v. Columbus,
249 U. S. 399, 39 Sup. Ct. Rep. 349 (1918); Binderup v. Pathe Exchange,
263 U. S. 291, 44 Sup. Ct. Rep. 96 (1923).
"0211 U. S. 210, 29 Sup. Ct. Rep. 67 (1908).
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mission from effecting certain rates which were alleged to be confisca-
tory. Under the Virginia Statute the Supreme Court of the state was
vested with power to review the findings of the Commission and sub-
stitute its own findings. The application to the Federal courts was
made without taking an appeal to the Virginia Supreme Court. The
United States Supreme Court permitted the application to be retained
(on other grounds) but stated that the orderly and proper course to
be pursued by the utility was an appeal to the Virginia Supreme
Court.
"The State of Virginia has endeavored to impose the
highest safeguards possible upon the exercise of the great
power given to the State Corporation Commission * * * by
making its decision dependent upon the assent of the same
historic body that is entrusted with the preservation of the
most valued constitutional rights, if the railroads see fit to
appeal. It seems to us only a just recognition of the solicitude
with which their rights have been guarded, that they should
make sure that the State in its final legislative action would
not respect what they think their rights to be, before resorting
to the courts of the United States." 11
In those states where power is vested in an appellate tribunal to
review the findings of the regulatory body and substitute its own
findings, an interlocutory injunction is premature, until an appeal is
taken to the appellate tribunal from an order of the Commission.
12
Pronouncement must have been made by the tribunal having the final
"legislative" authority of the state. However, injunctive relief may
properly be granted where the Commission attempts to enforce alleged
confiscatory rates, during the pendency of an appeal to the State
Court and a stay is denied. Upon a showing that the prescribed rates
are confiscatory the utility is entitled to have their enforcement en-
joined pending the continuance and completion of the rate-making
process. 13 The act of the Commission is a final legislative act as to
the time the rates would be in effect pending final determination.
On the other hand, where the Commission is vested with final
legislative authority, as in New York where a review by certiorari is
purely of a judicial character, no appeal need be taken.14 An injunc-
tion against the Commission will properly issue immediately upon
Ibid. at 230, 29 Sup. Ct. at 71.
'Supra Note 10; Cf. cases cited, infra Note 14.
"Oklahoma Natural Gas Co. v. Russell, 261 U. S. 290, 43 Sup. Ct. Rep.
353 (1922); Springfield Gas and Electric Company v. Barker, 231 Fed. 331
(W. D. Mo., 1915). See by analogy Northwestern Bell Telephone Company
v. Hilton, 274 Fed. 384 (D. C. Minn.. 1921).
" Supro Note 4, 262 U. S. 43; Bacon v. Rutland R. R. Co., 232 U. S. 134,
34 Sup. Ct. Rep. 283 (1913); Monroe Gaslight, etc. Co. v. Michigan Public
Utilities Commission, 292 Fed. 139 (D. C. Mich.. 1923).
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the rendition of its alleged confiscatory order.'0 An application
for a rehearing is not necessary where the granting of the rehearing
is entirely within the discretion of the Commission.' 6 If, however,
the Commission fixes an early date for the rehearing that fact may
be considered as an element affecting the exercise of judicial dis-
cretion in the granting of temporary injunctions.17
Thus, the first test to be applied in determining the propriety of
granting an interlocutory injunction is whether the prescribed rates
have been passed upon by the authority of the state having the final
"legislative" power. Then, and not until then, unless the preliminary
authority is attempting to enforce its alleged confiscatory decree
pending appeal, and a stay is denied, will an injunction properly issue.
The application being seasonably made, the next and essential
test is whether the alleged facts make out a prima facie case of
confiscation.
Obviously there can be no taking of property in violation of the
due process clause if the utility has contracted away its right to a
fair return, unless existing or subsequent legislation modifies the
contract.' 8 Where the effectiveness of a contract in the light of
alleged statutory modification is in question, and it cannot be clearly
shown that the contract is thereby rendered impotent, recourse to the
state courts for adjudication should be made before injunctive relief
may be properly had.'19 At least it may justifiably be said that the
discretion of the Court is severely taxed if an adjudication has not
been had.
In order to adduce a prima facie case of confiscation it is incum-
bent upon the petitioner to show that the property upon which it
alleges confiscation is properly included in the rate base. Factors
such as the unification of two systems for rate-making purposes and
'If respect is to be accorded the state commissions it is apparent that offi-
cial action or order of the commissions is necessary and will not be antici-
pated in the absence of special circumstances. "Alleged newspaper stories and
unbecoming dteclarations by counsel or city officials cannot be regarded here as of
grave importance." Gilchrist v. Interborough Company, supra Note 1, 279
U. S. at 208, 49 Sup. Ct. Rep. at 289. Were the only point in the Interborough
case that the petitioner did not await the official action of the Commission
it is likely that the order granting the injunction would have been affirmed,
regardless of that fact, in view of the disposition of former applications to
the Commission and statements made by Commission members in the present
application.
" Supra Note 4, 262 U. S. at 50, 43 Sup. Ct. Rep. at 469.7 Cumberland Telephone Co. v. Louisiana Commission, 283 Fed. 215 (E. D.
La., 1922) cited with approval in Prendergast v. New York Telephone Com-
pany, supra Note 4, 262 U. S. at 50, 43 Sup. Ct. Rep. at 469.
" Henderson Water Company v. Corporation Commission of North Caro-
lina, 269 U. S. 278, 46 Sup. Ct. Rep. 112 (1925) ; Columbus Railway Company
v. Columbus, 249 U. S. 399. 39 Sup. Ct. Rep. 349 (1918); Public Service
Company v. St. Cloud, 265 U. S. 352, 44 Sup. Ct. Rep. 492 (1923).
" "The effect of the contracts, long the subject of serious disputation,
depended upon the proper construction of State statutes-a matter primarily
for determination by the local courts." Supra Note 1, 279 U. S. at 208, 49
Sup. Ct. Rep. at 289.
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the claiming of a return on property leased from a municipality
require clear and convincing support as to their propriety in law.2 0
The application of the utility in Prendergast v. New York Tele-
phone Company 21 is the antithesis of the Interborough case in the
matter of sufficient facts upon which to grant summary relief. The
only problem in that case was the determination of a fair valuation of
the property used and useful in the operation of the utility, and the
relationship of the prescribed rates to the fair value.
"The bill specifically alleged that the cost of the com-
pany's property in the State devoted to the rendition of intra-
state telephone service, the cost of its reproduction and its fair
and reasonable value * * * and that the rates prescribed by
the Commission would prevent it from. earning more than
2.56% upon the cost of such property and 1.96% upon its fair
and reasonable value, and would not afford it a fair return upon
such value." 22
If the allegations were substantiated by proof it is apparent that
the prescribed rates were insufficient to yield a fair return on a fair
valuation and that the petitioner was being deprived of property in
violation of its constitutional rights.
The protection of constitutional rights is a grave responsibility
of the federal courts. To justify summary relief, however, the in-
vasion of the petitioner's rights must be clearly established by it. This
requires cogent and convincing evidence, the effect of which, inter-
preted in the light of existing principles of the law, shows that the
prescribed rates are insufficient in fact. The degree of success with
which this burden is met measures the propriety of the exercise of
judicial discretion in granting the temporary injunctive relief.
EDWIN P. WOLFE.
RIGHT TO RECOVER FOR BREACH OF IMPLIED WARRANTIES
IN SALES OF FOOD.
It is a well-settled principle in the law of sales that upon the sale
of food for human consumption there arises an implied warranty that
it is wholesome and fit for the use presumably intended. This was so
'*The failure adequately to support these contentions in the Interborough
case contributed largely to the reversal by the Supreme Court of the order
of the lower court.
"Supra Note 4.
Ibid. 262 U. S. at 47, 43 Sup. Ct. Rep. at 468.
